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In his pamphlet entitled, Whether 
Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, Luther 
addresses the question of calling and 
whether some callings are false. The 
cover letter to the honorable Assa von 
Kram notes that “…you and several 
others asked me to put my opinion into writing and publish it 
because many soldiers are offended by their occupation itself” 
(Luther 93). This and a related question—what sort of work can 
be properly classified as a vocation?—deserve reflection to reach 
a deeper understanding. 
Like Luther, I have reached the conclusion that economists, 
too, can be saved and that my vocation as a professor of 
economics and my students’ careers as learners (and even-
tual practitioners) of the discipline can be proper vocational 
callings from God. This essay will give a brief description 
of how these questions have arisen in my life and work and 
consider where vocation does (and where it could) intersect 
with the discipline of economics. I will touch on the question 
of defining a “proper” vocation as it relates to how one charac-
terizes preferences in economics. However, a full comparison 
of vocation and preferences will have to be the subject of 
another essay.
In Fall 2002, I was in my fifth year as an assistant professor 
of economics at Utah State University. My research was pro-
ceeding at a reasonable pace and I was meeting my teaching 
and service obligations, so tenure (while not guaranteed) 
seemed likely. Yet I had the distinct and nagging sense that 
Utah State was not the place for me to make a career. Part of 
this was for personal reasons—but the sense of mis-fit was 
deeper than that, and had to do with the separation I felt of 
faith from work. Professors at public universities must take 
care to separate religious faith from what is taught in the 
classroom, and I believe that this separation is important 
at any university. But in Utah, where it is impossible to live 
without bumping up against religious faith and its effects on 
everyday life, this seemingly artificial separation bothered 
me. If Luther was right, and every person has a vocation (a 
calling from God to a particular kind of work in the world) 
then it ought to be possible to live out this calling as part 
of a life of faith, instead of separate from it. I longed for a 
workplace where I could more overtly talk about and live my 
life of faith. 
Not surprisingly, an opening at Pacific Lutheran 
University that Fall struck me as a calling. The background 
sense of searching I had been experiencing made the listing 
(in my field and at a university owned by my church) seem to 
be exactly what I’d been waiting for. God was calling me—
what else could I do but apply?
As it turns out, I was right in ways I could not have imag-
ined. Since arriving at Pacific Lutheran, I have been drawn 
into the University’s Wild Hope Center for Vocation. This 
work has given direction to my own sense of calling, and 
more importantly to my work with students, both inside and 
out of the classroom. It has also afforded me the opportunity 
to think deeply about vocation and its relationship to my 
role as a faculty member. 
LYNN HUNNICUTT
Calling Economists 
LYNN HUNNICUTT is Associate Professor and Chair of Economics and the Director of the Wild Hope Center for Vocation, Pacific Lutheran 
University, Tacoma, Washington.
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Whether Economists, Too, Can be Saved 
Luther begins his essay by noting that there is a distinction 
between the occupation of soldier, and the soldier (man) him-
self. He then notes that ultimate salvation depends not on the 
occupation one holds, but on the grace that comes through 
faith in Christ. Since acts do not save, no war (no matter how 
justified) will earn salvation. The remainder of Luther’s essay 
is divided into three parts. In the first part, he argues that the 
occupation of soldier can be godly, for a number of reasons. 
He then goes on to conclude that some wars are justified and 
therefore godly. Finally, Luther argues that the person who 
holds the occupation of soldier can be godly, and that soldiers 
may work for pay. Interestingly, Luther sketches out a simple 
model of the feudal economy, in which soldiers provide pro-
tection for farmers, who (in turn) feed soldiers. He writes, 
The farmers feed us and the soldiers defend us. Those 
who have the responsibility of defending are to receive 
their income and their food from those who have the 
responsibility of feeding, so that they will be able to 
defend. Those who have the responsibility of feeding are 
to be defended by those who have the responsibility of 
defending, so that they will be able to provide food. (128) 
This is a rudimentary version of the circular flow diagram 
taught in economics courses today, with the soldiers purchas-
ing inputs (food) from farmers, and providing an output 
(protection services) to those same farmers.
Now an economist is not a soldier. We are not called to take 
up arms against others. And yet, our policy prescriptions affect 
human lives and can, on occasion, lead to human suffering and 
even death.1 We are seen, by some, as promoters of greed—as 
facilitators of acquisitiveness. Of course, self-interest, which is 
assumed in the standard modeling framework (Walsh 401-405), 
and greed are not the same, but the confusion of the two is 
common. And so the question arises: Can an economist, too, 
be saved? Is the call to economics as a field a proper vocation? 
As with soldiers, one may distinguish between the 
person and the occupation. As Luther notes, a man some-
times “takes a work that is good in itself and makes it bad 
for himself by not being very concerned about serving out 
of obedience and duty” (129). What matters is the reason 
the role is undertaken. Thus, one who “seek[s] only his own 
profit” is not right or good, even when the work is justifiable 
(129). Motivation matters. Yet the question remains whether 
a person may be saved even as they serve in an “unjustified” 
occupation (if such a thing exists). 
Luther himself was a professor, and remained so even after 
he began the reform movement within the Catholic church. 
Thus, it seems clear that Luther would agree the role of profes-
sor is a proper vocational calling, as long as one does not use it 
to seek money or favors. But what about economics as a calling? 
Can one legitimately profess economics? Perhaps a distinction 
can be made between the field and the occupation. As a profes-
sor of economics, I am called, first and foremost, to profess. 
Economics is the discipline I am trained in, and the topic I  
profess most regularly, but it is through this profession that I 
serve both my students and colleagues. This is my vocation.
Self-Interest and Being-Called
Is the profession of economics, then, an unethical thing? 
After all, doesn’t economics promote self-interest above all 
and help devise ways for firms and individuals to obtain 
more at the expense of other people (including unborn future 
generations), non-human creatures, and the earth? Am I 
not training little self-interested (greedy) creatures to build 
empires and exploit the world around them? You will not be 
surprised to learn that my answer to this question is “no”—
with some qualification. For one thing, “study of” is not the 
same as “advocacy for.” While it is true that rational self-
interest is a foundational assumption in almost all economic 
modeling, this is a statement of the human condition, not 
necessarily an assessment of its desirability. 
Adam Smith, the founder of modern economic theory, 
defends the distinction between self-interest and mere 
greed. In both of his two major works, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759) and The Wealth of Nations (1776),2 Smith 
assumes that self-interest is not in-and-of-itself morally 
objectionable. He writes: 
We are not ready to suspect any person of being defec-
tive in selfishness. This is by no means the weak side 
of human nature, or the failing of which we are apt 
to be suspicious… Carelessness and want of economy 
are universally disapproved of, not…as proceeding 
from a want of benevolence, but from a want of the 
proper attention to the objects of self–interest. (Moral 
Sentiments XII.II.87)
And yet, what Smith here describes as mere human 
nature and neutral motivation for economic action was for 
Luther the root of sin. Indeed, closely related to self-interest 
is Luther’s view that people are “curved in on themselves.” 
Yet notice that, for Luther, the condition of being curved in 
“Is the call to economics as a field a 
proper vocation?”
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on oneself is morally objectionable; it closes us off from God 
and the needy neighbor. It is the duty of the Christian to live 
life in service to the common good. What is this life lived in 
service to the common good? Luther’s answer: Vocation. 
Unlike Luther, then, economists take self-interest as a 
starting point and use the assumption to better understand 
human action, not its motivation. This is the point of depar-
ture, and also where economics ceases to consider vocation as 
it is understood in other disciplines. Thus, to ask a mainstream 
economist to consider vocation is tantamount to asking her to 
move into some distant and slightly uncomfortable vacation 
rental home, with its coffee maker that doesn’t work in the way 
she’s used to and the neighbors who speak a dialect that she has 
trouble understanding. It might be possible, even pleasurable, 
but it is not quite like home where she knows which drawer 
holds the apple slicer.
In short, the economist takes no position on this funda-
mental aspect of the human condition. Instead, she considers 
the world as it exists, through the lens of self-interest. Indeed, 
most economists would say this is not properly a part of 
our discipline. It is a foundational assumption that is rarely 
noticed, and even less commonly questioned.
In other words, if being self-interested is morally neutral, 
then no claims regarding who should be served can be made. 
The economic agent is left alone, to serve who he wills in his 
self-interested way. This is not to say that each person has the 
capacity to fulfill all of his needs, but rather that by invok-
ing the self-interest of others, his own needs are also satis-
fied. Self-interest, not direct attention to the neighbor’s need, 
becomes the root of true benevolence. As Smith writes in his 
later work:
But man has almost constant occasion for the help of 
his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from 
their benevolence only…It is not from the benevolence of 
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We 
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-
love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of 
their advantages. (Wealth of Nations 13) 
Smith further notes that as long as markets are free and 
information is easily available, self-interested is guided, as 
if by an invisible hand, to improve society’s general level of 
welfare and therefore the welfare of others. It is possible to go 
even further and explain altruistic behavior while remaining 
within the realm of self-interest, so that people are concerned 
with the welfare of others and the common good due to their 
self-interested nature (Andreoni; Becker). But this concern 
for the welfare of others is not the same thing as vocation. 
Economics has no sense of responding to a call to serve the 
common good in the way that Luther describes vocation. 
Instead, because the discipline assumes self-interest, serving 
the common good is a result which must be shown to come 
from a reinterpretation of self-interest.
Now, this setting aside of moral questions regarding human 
nature has enabled economics to make great strides in describ-
ing the world around us. Metaphors like Smith’s invisible hand 
or Marshall’s scissors of supply and demand (Marshall V.III.7) 
help us understand the nature and advantages of markets as 
a way to organize economic activity. Advances like David 
Ricardo’s description of gains from trade (ch. 7)—the idea 
that engaging in trade can make both trading partners better 
off—suggest that individuals and countries are better off with 
open economies than with closed. Cournot’s use of mathemati-
cal models to describe competition between firms has enabled 
new discoveries and relatively accurate accounts of outcomes 
in many industries (ch. 4-8). In all of these cases, self-interested 
behavior was assumed, never questioned. Vocation simply 
doesn’t arise in this work. Furthermore, many of these ideas 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to describe if the writer 
had to justify the use of self-interested behavior before present-
ing his theory. What McCloskey calls “prudence only”—at 
the exclusion of the other virtues—has gotten us a long way 
(“Bourgeois Virtue” 297-317).
Accounting for Vocation
Since the question of who should be served does not arise in 
mainstream economics, the discipline is left without obvious 
tools to address questions of vocation. This is not seen as a 
problem, as mainstream economics does not often see a need 
to consider vocation. That said, the work of two economists 
(among many others whose deserving work is not mentioned 
here) questions both the assumptions of the mainstream eco-
nomic model and the desirability of the discipline’s so-called 
neutrality on ethical issues. This work might provide a way 
to consider vocation while remaining within the discipline of 
economics, at least as broadly construed.
“This concern for the welfare of others 
is not the same thing as vocation. 
Economics has no sense of responding 
to a call to serve the common good in 
the way that Luther describes vocation.”
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First, Deirdre McCloskey has written a number of works 
in which she questions the assumptions economists make. 
Starting with The Rhetoric of Economics, and through The 
Bourgeois Virtues, McCloskey points out that mainstream 
economic analysis relies on only one of the seven classical 
virtues, that of prudence. She notes that this limited view leaves 
us unable to address many questions of interest (which, I would 
say, includes questions of vocation), and causes some of our 
claims to be silly, at best, and harmful, at worst. This idea that 
the discipline might properly address other virtues, while still 
remaining recognizably economics, could provide a way to 
incorporate questions of vocation and the common good into 
economics. It could also lead us to more sensible conclusions 
and away from what McCloskey calls the “the unexamined 
rhetoric of economic quantification” and “the rhetoric of sig-
nificance tests” (Rhetoric of Economics, ch. 7-8).
Second, George DeMartino has called for the discipline of 
economics to address questions of ethics in a more rigorous way. 
The consideration of who is harmed by the actions of econo-
mists is an ethical question that DeMartino suggests needs to 
be addressed. Who should be served is a closely related topic 
that will naturally arise as DeMartino’s challenge is addressed. 
And this question leads directly to what I define here as voca-
tion. Economic ethics does not necessarily (or only) imply an 
economic understanding of vocation. It might also provide an 
avenue into the question of what should occur. “Should” is not a 
word that mainstream economics is well-equipped to address, 
although it is a necessary word for thinking about vocation. 
As it stands, mainstream economics does not, and for 
many cannot, address vocation. Because we take self-interest 
as given, questions of calling and serving the common good 
cannot be completely or perhaps even adequately addressed. 
This, I believe, is a loss for the discipline. While it seems safe 
to conclude that economists, too, can be saved—even those 
who have no interest in virtues other than prudence or in 
questions of ethics—our discipline would be enriched by the 
addition of those who work outside the standard paradigm. 
So, then, I issue this call to action: Let us go forth and find 
ways to talk about vocation, even as we remain economists.
End Notes
1. An example of the way the decisions of economists affect human 
lives can be found in the causes of the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Many economists conclude that government actions taken at the 
behest of economic policymakers either caused or contributed to the 
duration and severity of the depression. See “Symposia: The Great 
Depression” in Journal of Economic Perspectives 7:2 (Spring 1993). 
Among the causes considered are government monetary and fiscal 
policies as well as nations’ adherence to the gold standard.
2. While self-interest is generally assumed in The Wealth of 
Nations, it is one of many human characteristics addressed in Smith’s 
other major work, the Theory of Moral Sentiments. This work, then, 
is necessary background reading for The Wealth of Nations, and it is 
unfortunate that some consider only Smith’s second book without the 
context given in the first.
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